In light of the recent European refugee crisis, the article uses the concept of security community (SC), in order to explore the destabilizing impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on the Schengen Area. Theoretically, it is nourished by the will to support efforts by security community researchers to explore the challenges besetting security communities rather than just tracing their evolution. Viewed from a constructivist prism, the article describes how through a complex social process, immigration-related threat perceptions can trigger a security dilemma dynamic among SC states, undermining the SC's basic trust and common identity, and encouraging states to abandon cooperative norms for unilateral defensive practices. Empirically; we show how immigration-related threat perceptions are working against the Schengen regime by examining well-established evaluation indicators in the SC literature. Finally, two avenues for future research are suggested in considering how to surmount the negative dynamics: the first draws on existing desecuritization literature, the second builds on existing SC literature addressing the rehabilitation of collective identities and trust among an SC's members in times of crisis.
Introduction
The year 2015 may be remembered as the year Europe had to deal with the greatest movement of people fleeing conflict, since the end of Second World War. This unprecedented migratory pressure on the doorstep of Europe has triggered a fierce public debate around the possible demise of one of the major achievements of European integration, namely the Schengen Area.
In light of these events, the article uses the concept of security community (SC), in order to explore the destabilizing impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on the Schengen Area. Theoretically, it is nourished by the will to support efforts by security community researchers to explore the challenges besetting security communities rather than just tracing their evolution, using the Schengen Area as a case study.
Viewed from a constructivist prism, the article describes a causal mechanism that destabilizes SCs following immigration-related threat perceptions. Through a complex social process, immigration-related threat perceptions can trigger a security dilemma dynamic among SC states, undermining the SC's basic trust and common identity, and encouraging states to abandon cooperative norms for unilateral defensive practices. Examination of well-established evaluation indicators in the SC literature reveals how immigration-related threat perceptions undermine SCs. These indicators include: multilateralism, unfortified borders, community discourse, 'we-feeling' language, but also integration level, policy coordination against 'internal' threats, free movement of SC populations, and internationalization of authority and rule. The article therefore shows that although immigration-related threat perceptions do not actually affect the absence of preparation for armed conflict as a characteristic of SCs, they do challenge other significant SC features, such as intersubjective understandings as well as overlapping and concentric inter-states practices, and thus deserve our attention. 1 We illustrate our argument with a case study of an 'uncontested' SC, namely Europe (Adler and Barnett 1998, 16; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 3, 190-191; Bremberg 2015; Weaver 1998) . Specifically, we demonstrate how immigration-related threat perceptions have destabilized the Schengen Area as a security community. We are well aware of the fact that the Schengen Area is embedded within other supranational and inter-governmental frameworks of cooperation between European states in the field of security and other political dimensions. Our decision to focus on Schengen is nourished by both methodological and empirical considerations. Methodologically, we believe that focusing on Schengen serves as a laser-like tool to better illustrate our theoretical insights. Furthermore, Schengen constitutes an ideal illustration of the abstract conceptualization of a SC because of its materialist characteristics (i.e. clearly defined area of highly integrated sovereign states enjoying free movement and unfortified borders) and ideational features (i.e. attachment to the European idea, sense of common identity, and mutual trust).
The article then contributes to two main bodies of literature: the theoretical literature on security communities and the empirical literature on the Schengen regime. Regarding the first, we note that IR interest in SCs was aroused by the puzzling cooperative behaviour of states and the existence of 'communities' in an anarchical system. Consequently, most research has focused theoretically and empirically on SC evolution, as in the North Atlantic Area, Europe, Euro-Med Area, South East Asia, South America, US-Mexican relations, the Arab Gulf States, and even NATO-Russia (Acharya 2001; Adler and Barnett 1998; Bellamy 2004; Bremberg 2015; Collins 2007; Deutsch 1957; Pouliot 2007 Pouliot , 2011 .
More recently, SC researchers have investigated SC challenges rather than simply analysing their evolution. Several studies have examined the potential for severe disruption in SC functioning due to 'identity crisis '; uncertainty (Bially-Mattern 2005; Kitchen 2009);  perceived incompatible values 2 , and violation of one member's habitus by another (Bjola and Kornprobst 2007) . Domestic violence has also been pointed out as a factor hampering SC formation, as illustrated by intra-state instability in Africa (Nathan 2006) . Finally, Adler and Greve (2009) showed that SCs are complex, multi-perspective security governance systems that can overlap with other security governance systems such as the balance of power that can limit or even challenge the SC.
The article pursues this thinking by focusing on the destabilizing impact of immigrationrelated threat perceptions on SCs. Even though our theoretical framework draws upon a few elements developed in the above literature (in terms of identity crisis and the damage to habitual practices), it clearly departs from previous researches by developing a specific mechanism destabilizing the SC, and by focusing on immigration-related threat perceptions as the variable causing the crisis within the SC. Furthermore, while the studies mentioned above reckons with the 'solving' mechanism of the crisis, we leave this aspect to future research and focus on the destabilizing mechanism itself.
The destabilizing impact of immigration-related threat perceptions has inadequately been addressed, possibly due to the taken-for-granted assumption that a perceived threat from immigration strengthens SCs-either at the common identity narrative level or at the practical level of increased multilateral and cooperative measures against the perceived threat (Adler and Barnett 1998: 57; Bremberg 2015; RUDOLF 2006: 159, 212) . This view stems from the conviction that enmity (as a constructed 'other') builds trust among SC members thus stabilizing it by setting insiders apart from outsiders and reinforcing collective identity and internal cohesion (Koschut 2014: 547) . On the contrary, we argue that because (illegal) immigration is an unmanageable trans-boundary phenomenon, immigration-related threat perceptions can destabilize SCs diverting member states from regional integration towards traditional power politics, rather than stimulating regional cooperation and solidarity against an emerging internal 'threat'. In sum, the article examines the causal mechanism of the social construction of a security dilemma among SC member states that subverts central SC constitutive features, such as common identification and mutual trust as well as multilateral and integrationist dynamics.
As to the second area of contribution, i.e. the literature on the Schengen regime, our explanation for the weakness of the regime, is based on a socio-psychological mechanismwhich clearly constitutes a novelty in this area of research. Indeed, until now, the main explanations accounting for the weaknesses of the Schengen regime have been very similar to the criticism often voiced against the EU. First, the economic explanation contends that support for the EU (including Schengen) may have declined among the public and decision-makers following the realization that EU membership has accelerated the downturn in national economies (Abts, Heerweghy, et al., 2009, 2-3, 15; Lubbers and Scheeper 2010, 791; Quaglia 2011, 45; Webber 2014, 345, 353-357) . Another explanation draws on democratic deficit theory stressing the detrimental impact of growing de-legitimization of European institutions following undemocratic decision-making processes within the EU and related regimes (Abbarno and Zapryanova 2013, 584; Abts, Heerweghy et al., 2009: 17; Hix 2007, 140; Rohrschneider 2002, 472; Schmidt 2013, 2) . Thirdly, the neorealist argument focuses on the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, which fundamentally altered the European balance of power and removed the Europeans' incentive to integrate politically, militarily, and economically against an overwhelmingly powerful adversary, since then disappeared (Rosato 2011a (Rosato : 10, 2011b .
So the article contributes to the EU and Schengen crisis literature by proposing a new interpretation of member states' behaviour, which not only examines economic and political factors but also deep socio-psychological processes. It also highlights the impact of immigration-related fears and threat perceptions as a destabilizing variable in the internal dynamics of Schengen states, thereby continuing Cornelisse's research on the current Schengen crisis (2014). While she emphasizes the institutional and political tension between the abolition of internal border controls on the one hand and the member states' willingness to retain considerable powers over immigration by third country nationals into their territories on the other, our research further explains this inner tension by demonstrating the interplay between two contradictory security logics in the Schengen Area: the SC and the security dilemma associated with immigration-related threat perceptions. We believe that the socio-psychological component is a matter of great import, considering its capacity to shake and deeply implicate virtually all the members of the SC -compared to other crises which do not trigger such extreme reactions at such a wide scale (like the current economic sovereign debt crisis).
The article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical section explains the conceptual framework, especially the causal mechanism through which immigration-related threat 
SC characteristics
Fascinated by the existence of 'communities' in an area torn by violence and power politics, the study of SCs developed extensively in the second half of the 20 th century and is still flourishing.
First introduced by Deutsch et al., in the late 1960s, the concept of SC refers to 'a group of people who have become integrated to the point where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way' (Deutsch in Adler 1997, 255) . In the 1990s, Adler and Barnett redefined pluralistic SC stressing its identity component. They described such communities as 'socially constructed 'cognitive regions' or 'community regions' whose people imagine that, with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end' (Adler 1997, 255) . In the past decade, two conceptual supplements were added to SC theory. While Pouliot (2008) developed a theory of SC practice arguing that peace exists in and through practice, Koschut (2014) added an emotional dimension to the study of SC.
Besides distinguishing between SC development phases-nascent, ascendant, and mature-SC researchers have also identified SC indicators. Institutionalized multilateralism is one indicator of an emerging SC: member states are more likely to deal with common interests through joint mechanisms such as consensual decision-making procedures and structures which bring together high-level regional representatives who automatically incorporate the interests of all member states and are thus likely to be more consensual than other types of interstate relations (Adler and Barnett 1998, 55; Pouliot 2007, 608) . Here some researchers add that SCs are characterized by expansion of transgovernmental networks, where civil servants in government departments and agencies, and military officers, work together in cooperative endeavours to implement SC policy (Bremberg 2015) . Another indicator is unfortified borders.
Although border checks and patrols persist, they are expected to secure states against nonmilitary threats (Adler and Barnett 1998, 55; Pouliot 2007, 608) . A third indicator is changes in military planning. Such changes occur because members are no longer potential enemies in military scenarios (Adler and Barnett 1998, 56; Pouliot 2007, 608 (Adler and Barnett 1998, 56; Bremberg 2015 , Koschut 2014 Pouliot 2007, 608) . Tightly coupled SCs are also characterized by other indicators. First, they adopt policies of cooperative and collective security against urgent and exceptional measures (Adler and Barnett 1998, 56; Bremberg 2015) . Second, they enjoy high levels of military integration by pooling military resources (Adler and Barnett 1998, 56) . Third, member states have greater policy coordination and low-key and routine security practices (for example, 'patroling') against 'internal' threats (Adler and Barnett 1998, 57; Bremberg 2015) .
Fourth, tightly coupled SC's allow free movement of individuals between different member states, which are no longer seen as a potential threat (Adler and Barnett 1998, 57) . Finally, mature SCs are characterized by shared coordinated public policies and systems of rule to the point of internalizing policies and law (Adler and Barnett 1998, 57) .
Immigration-related threat perceptions as an explanatory variable
We will now briefly present the main tenets of securitization theory, highlighting those elements most salient to our research, namely the social construction of migrants as a security threat in SC's focusing on national elites. It is indeed necessary to go at great length in explaining how the securitization of migrants unfolding within the different members of the SC, generates immigration-related threat perceptions that have in turn a detrimental impact on their relations. We basically show how a 'securitized object' has the potential to transcend national boundaries and affect the relations among the members of a SC.
Though it is true that immigration-related threat perceptions may be prompted by rapid immigration-related demographic changes, which are in some way unlawful or illegitimate (RUDOLF 2006, 26) , the question is whether these perceptions are really 'objective' or socially constructed as objective. The present research clearly supports the latter view by stressing that immigration-related threat perceptions are subject to social construction following powerful securitization processes. Securitization of migration involves extreme politicization and framing of migration as a security threat. This follows discursive activities or routinized practices such as surveillance and border controls (Balzacq 2010; Bigo 1994 Bigo , 2000 Bigo , 2008 Bigo , 2009 Leonard 2010; Neal 2009 ), which foster the belief that immigrants represent an existential threat to the state and its citizens. This allows the securitizing actor to argue the need for emergency measures to deal with migrants and justifies actions outside normal political procedure (Buzan, Waever et al., 1998, 25 ). An example is the framing of legal and illegal migrants 5 as an existential threat to the host society justifying restrictive migration policies and the militarization of immigration-politics. Migration is generally socially constructed as a security threat to the whole socioeconomic and political spectrum: migrants are usually constructed as destabilizing internal security by correlating crime/terror with foreigners, as challenging both welfare provision and economic growth because they cheat the system, and by threatening majority identities and values at state and regional levels (Huysmans 2000) . 6 While acknowledging that both the elite and public levels (Huysmans 2006, 46; Bigo 2009 , 586) fuel top-down and bottom-up securitization processes, we embrace the classical securitization theories' emphasis on the political leader's role in determining and defining threats. Indeed, national political leaders, as powerful people and defenders of the national interests, are considered to be 'the accepted voice of security' (Buzan 1998, 31) . While working closely with other securitizing actors, such as 'transnational security professionals' (Bigo 2002) who possess the know-how and status needed to generate legitimate security discourses (Bigo 1994 ) -national elites remain the ultimate actor responsible for taking far-reaching decisions affecting SC cohesion. The study also argues that the social construction of migrants as a threat is so deeply entrenched in the social structure that it significantly affects the psyche of the state and its decision makers-contrasting with the dominant view that states and decision-makers use securitization processes instrumentally to increase power by legitimizing exceptional crackdowns against perceived security threat ( 
Social construction of a SC's security dilemma dynamic
The traditional view 7 of 'a security dilemma' argues that mutual suspicion and a chronic atmosphere of uncertainty, fear and anxiety embedded in the anarchical system invariably causes states, fearing for own security (See Booth and Wheeler 2008, 22-28; Jervis 1976, 64-66 ), 8 to act in self-defence 9 . The security dilemma is linked to two apparently inevitable predicaments in international politics: first, decision-makers in one state can never get fully into the minds of counterparts in other states and can never be certain of understanding their motives or intentions. Second, policy planners in one state can never fully predict when and how other states may deploy weapons (the so-called 'inherent ambiguity of weapons') (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 4) . Security in general creates a vicious circle of mutual tension and unnecessary conflict (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 5) .
Whereas realists regard the security dilemma as a permanent feature in international politics, constructivists consider it a social construct of intersubjective understandings based on a social construction of conflictual identities, fear, and perceptions of competitive security.
These factors undermine trust between states so much that they assume the worst of each other and start seeing self-help as an interest (Wendt 1995, 73; See also Alexseev 2006; Hopf 1998, 188,190; Snyder and Jervis 1999) . As for weapons, which are the material expression of the threat underpinning the security dilemma, they do not explain anything in themselves but they gain meaning and influence over human behaviour due to the power of common interpretations and understandings -in our context fear, mistrust, and defensive behaviour (Wendt 1995, 74) .
Although the security dilemma dynamic is difficult to change, especially because of its stability and the psychological security it gives to states (Mitzen 2006) 10 , constructivists disagree that the very nature of the security dilemma makes negative outcomes unavoidable.
Wendt describes a social process, which can transform competitive security systems into cooperative systems where new intersubjective understandings are constructed, identities and practices are changed, and mutual trust can slowly develop (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 94; Hoffman 2002, 370; Hoffman 2006; Pouliot 2008, 278-9; Wendt 1992, 420-421 
Deconstruction of collective identity and reconstruction of Self-Other identities-In this stage,
states critically examine old notions of Self and Other and the structures of interaction that maintained them. They question other states' intentions and abilities and imagine worst-case scenarios. They begin interpreting other members' behaviour as uncooperative and develop negative images of other states and their joint institutions. The key point is that the perceived unwillingness and inability of fellow member states and of joint institutions to effectively control community borders in a borderless community, is not only suspected, but also assumed and anticipated.
Changes in practices-As uncertainties rise regarding other states' intentions and capabilities, and acute immigration fears and negative images about other members and common institutions grow, some members decide they would rather not take risks. Instead, they turn to transformative self-defence practices; we qualify these as transformative because they run counter to the SC's long-standing normative practices. There are two types of transformative practices: unilateral reinstatement of internal borders (defensive self-help) and issuing temporal visas unilaterally, which other members may consider offensive since immigrants are not only constructed as threats but as weapons as well.
Violation of trust-When one or more SC states take defensive steps trust is broken. When states that do preserve the status quo lose confidence and question their previous positive expectations (based on shared norms and emotions and trust in the stability of the other states' identities), the result is a negative view of the situation and emotional distress generating 'negative emotions'
(anger, stigmatization, etc.) (Koschut 2014, 537-538) . 13 Whereas Koschut (2014, 537-538) believes that negative emotions can help rid the SC of sources of discord and often signal emotional attachment to the SC, we argue that negative emotions generated by the recurrent violation of communal norms like multilateralism and free movement, can signal a shift in members' mutual perceptions from 'colleague' to 'enemy' or at least to an 'other'. Instead of stabilizing the SC, 'negative emotions' can create new divisions and profound mistrust.
Security paradox-Violation of trust and ensuing low levels of trust between certain SC members causes others to respond with similar defensive measures, producing further layers of mistrust in a vicious circle.
Evaluating the impact of this process on the SC
This section articulates our last theoretical claim that immigrant-related threat perceptions destabilize SCs through the above mechanisms, namely the social construction of the security dilemma by the SC states. We assess this claim by examining new weaknesses that have emerged in several well-established SC indicators:
Multilateralism-When immigration-related threat perceptions produce a security dilemma dynamic that weakens SC members' basic trust it may prompt states to defect from cooperative norms and adopt unilateral defensive practices. This includes unilateral steps to restore border controls and reject integration / issue-specific membership. Discourses and language of community expressing a we-feeling-In the context of the immigration-related security dilemma we argue that problems with understanding other states'
intentions and abilities cause some SC members to view fellow states and joint institutions negatively. This arouses scepticism regarding the regional community's discourse.
Cooperative and collective security-We suggest that immigration-related fears and uncertainties weaken cooperative security mechanisms by allowing immediate self-defensive actions by individual states. This includes resurrecting borders under special circumstances or excluding members that fail to meet their commitments from the community. Following security fears, the increased likelihood of states defecting and states' readiness to resort to worse (offensive) measures (e.g., unilateral temporal visa requirement) which bypass cooperative institutions, can further weaken cooperative security mechanisms.
Weaker policy coordination against 'internal' threats-Although there may be increased institutionalized cooperation among SC members aimed at tackling immigration, which is seen as a threat, the fear that other member states cannot or will not confront immigration might increase national controls away from the borders.
Free movement of populations within the SC-Here we argue that the freedom of cross border mobility, which is a key principle in a tightly coupled security community, is undermined by a desire to secure borders prompted by the atmosphere of immigration-related uncertainty and mistrust towards fellow SC members.
Internationalization of authority and rule (supranationalism)-Weak supranationalism is
especially apparent in the context of migration controls. In a security-dilemma environment, supranationalism is weakened when member states considered unable or unwilling to tackle the common threats become increasingly considered security threats.
Schengen Area put to the test: Impact of Immigration Related-Threat Perceptions on SCs
This section reflects on the theoretical arguments developed above and unfolds as follows: first,
we present a short history of the Schengen Area and characterise it as a SC. Then, we establish the robustness of our explanatory variable, namely the intensification of immigration-related threat perceptions in the European SC at the elite level. Finally, we examine the immigrationrelated threat perceptions' impact on the social construction of the security dilemma dynamic, as exemplified in recent relations among member states.
Schengen Area as a Security Community
The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 as a parallel European initiative to the European Union. It eliminated internal border controls and deepened the Common Market (Cornelisse 2014, 744-745, 777-778; Zaioti 2011, 2, 69) . In the late 1990s, the Schengen regime was incorporated into the EU (Cornelisse 2014, 747-748) . Nowadays, it includes all EU memberswith the notable exceptions of Great Britain and Ireland, plus non-EU countries such as Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland (Zaiotti 2011, 5) .
The Schengen Area is a tightly coupled SC. There are several indicators supporting this claim. First, it is largely considered a common 'imagined community' with a collective identity.
As Zaiotti noted, 'It became the symbol of a sui generis entity…. a normative environment functioning as a socializing arena and point of reference around which new ideas are anchored' (Zaiotti 2011, 6, 10, 54, 81) . Second, the Schengen regime sought to create a common space where not only goods and capitals but also individuals could circulate freely (Zaiotti 2011, 2) .
More specifically, the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) prohibits internal border checks and permits the temporal reinstatement of such checks only under exceptional circumstances (Cornelisse 2014, 750) . Third, as a 'European Space' it is characterized by 'post-national' political, economic, and military integration (Bremberg 2015) . Fourth, the Schengen states also transcend a close meaning of 'security' by reconceptualising national security as no longer a matter of territorial defence but one of collective threats and risks (Bremberg 2015) . Since its inception, the regime also sought to move border controls to the external perimeter of the Schengen area while establishing other more diffuse forms of control within and beyond the regime (Zaiotti 2011, 2, 72) . Fifth, Schengen members developed common 'policies of protection' and mechanisms of coordination 14 within the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including counter-terrorism, police and judicial cooperation, border, asylum and migration management, and civil protection, to deal with common threats (Bremberg 2015) . Sixth, transgovernmental networks and agencies and other coordination mechanisms play a prominent role in 'internal' security (FRONTEX, Eurosur and Schengen Information System (I, II)) (Bremberg 2015; Cornelisse 2014, 750; Zaiotti 2011, 163) . Seventh, as Zaiotti shows, border control has become a matter of multilateral negotiation where key decisions are taken by regional institutions composed of both intergovernmental and supranational actors (Schengen Executive Committee, Council of the European Union, European Commission) (Zaiotti 2011, 3) . Furthermore, the Schengen Area redistributes policy implementation responsibilities among national governments-corresponding to 'intensive transgovernmentalism' (Zaiotti 2011, 4) .
Finally, these collective arrangements, indicating the partial renouncement of a key statist function, arguably require a significant amount of trust among Schengen members-one of the main constitutive features of the Schengen Area as a SC.
Immigration-related threat perceptions among Schengen Area states
In the past twenty years, the Schengen Area has witnessed widespread immigration-related fears and threat perceptions. This sub-section presents evidence that many Schengen states show symptoms of growing anti-immigrant attitudes and immigration-related threat perceptions at the national elite level-alongside attempts to oppose this trend. We assume that immigration-related threat perceptions are largely due to a complex social construction of meaning, i.e. securitization processes. We do not present here an in-depth analysis of migrationlinked securitization measures but use existing literature to support our argument. Indeed, previous studies, demonstrate a growing immigration-related threat perception at the elite level in Schengen member states. Particularly telling is that migration, as a multi-dimensional security threat has gained in importance since the 1990s, and even more so following 9/11, in
Western European domestic and regional elite discourse ( Europe has proven 'Fortress Europe' to be unsealed. The shift in perception of the immigrationrelated threat from an 'external' threat to an 'internal' one has produced new uncertainties. Let us now explore how these powerful uncertainties have (the potential to trigger Schengen's mutual security dilemma dynamics.
The social construction of the security dilemma among Schengen Member States
To demonstrate the first seeds of the social construction of the security dilemma dynamic, this (Groenendjik 2004, 160) . Indeed, Article 2(2) of the SIA allows member states to reinstate checks only if public policy or national security requires and only for a limited period. 30 In the past twenty years, Article 2(2) has mainly been applied before sporting or political events when anticipating large-scale internal disorder. More interestingly, however, we also find cases where the clear aim was to restrict immigration of third country nationals (Groenendjik 2004, 160) . During the period in question, 2007-2015, we find several examples of a migration threat followed by reintroduction of internal Schengen Area borders checks. In
April 2011, France re-established border controls to curb North African migrants from entering the country from Italy. Similarly, in March 2012, Germany, France, the UK, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden issued a common letter threatening to reinstate 'emergency internal border controls' if Greece did not improve its border security with Turkey, 31 and
Sweden demanded a reintroduction of border controls equivalent to 'permanent' controls. 32 The recent refugee crisis in Europe magnified this dynamic, with Hungary and Slovenia erecting borders along the exterior Schengen border, quickly followed by Austria, Germany, 33 Denmark, and the Netherlands. This time these countries re-imposed controls and a military presence along their borders with other member states, acknowledging that they could scarcely cope with thousands of asylum seekers arriving each day to their territory.
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 Alternative security controls
To bypass Schengen Area restrictions on resurrecting internal borders, some states have developed alternative unilateral security controls to side step restrictions. These involve indirect and discrete measures including smart technologies and frequent national border patrols, indicating some states' desire to retain some control over their borders due to doubts over other states' abilities to curb immigration threats and their intentions towards migration. These policing measures have been emplaced to monitor the people's movement to and from member states as a form of compensatory security control. 35 This defensive practice particularly increased after the 2007 Schengen Enlargement. At this time, the Czech authorities complained to Austria and Germany regarding invalid controls on Czech citizens. 36 The recent refugee crisis amplified this dynamic, as exemplified by the Swedish government's temporary introduction of identity checks for all travelers wanting to cross the Oresund Bridge. 37 This rationale indicates a strong lack of trust in member states and a desire to protect themselves, being driven by worstcase scenario predictions and the anticipated poor performance from others.
 Exclusion and suspension of Schengen Area membership
States can defend themselves by excluding fellow Schengen states if the latter are ineffective in their commitments. This clause, which permits temporary suspension of a state's membership, was introduced after 2011 as part of the revised Schengen Agreement. It established a direct linkage between the unsatisfactory application of the Schengen acquis by one member state and the suspension of freedom of movement for nationals of that state and third country nationals holding similar EU rights. 38 Following the 2015 refugee crisis, EU ministers actually discussed the suspension of Greece and potentially more member states. 39 States suspicious can also try to prevent others from 'harming' them by opposing new states' accession into the community. 40 This unambiguous act of rejection not only shows that states doubt the capacities/intentions of new candidates to protect the SC's external borders; but it can also be interpreted as a lack of trust in EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, which recommends accepting countries. 41 Reluctance to accept new members was particularly striking in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania (Ciobanu 2013 ). 42 Although the justification for the delay in their acceptance is couched in legal jargon, the real reason has been a fear that a 'high level of corruption, and the widespread presence of organized crime will affect the countries' capacity to effectively manage Europe's borders', allowing illegal waves of migrants to cross Europe (Zaiotti 2013 Europe failed to find a solution to the Greek debt crisis. 47 In the same vein, during the July 2015 refugee crisis, Hungary followed in the footsteps of its southern neighbors-Greece and Italythat routinely avoid registering and fingerprinting some of the refugees and illegal migrants arriving, allowing them to head north unchecked, even before German's suspension of the Dublin prerogatives. 48 Denmark then imitated Hungary and allowed refugees to move freely through its territory to Sweden.
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Stage IV -Loss of trust. The adoption of the above defensive practices signals member states that they can no longer depend on each other regarding these issues. When the confidence once based on common norms and identity perceptions is lost, a profound breakdown in trust occurs among SC members. show.
In spring 2011, this domino effect was evident when states responded to each others'
decisions by re-establishing a degree of control over migratory movements across their borders.
As Cecilia 
Conclusions
Immigration-related threat perceptions have generated a series of security dilemma dynamics, which destabilize the Schengen Area as a SC. Even though cooperative counter-moves are also taking place, the security-dilemma logic prevails and succeeds in challenging the Schengen project. To make substantiate this argument, we look at several recognized indicators of a SC.
Broadly speaking, the outcomes of the security dilemma mechanism correspond to a growing tendency among Schengen Member States to reject cooperative norms of multilateralism in favour of unilateral defensive practices. There is no gainsaying that there have also been repeated attempts at arriving to common European solutions embedded in a discourse supporting a multilateral approach to immigration issues, even at the height of the refugee crisis in summer 2015. These have first and foremost been put forward by the European Last but not least, the internationalization of authority and rule indicator also shows signs of weakening due to immigration-related threat perceptions and the mechanism they trigger. Indeed, the Commission keeps pushing for common immigration and refugee policy even in times of crisis. In September 2015, it even suggested a revolutionary permanent relocation mechanism that would allow dealing with future refugee crisis situations more
swiftly. Yet, in the period following the Franco-Italian border dispute, as well as during the refugee crisis in 2015, European institutions allowed states considerable national latitude over migration and border control (Cornelisse 2014, 766-767) . It is also not sure whether the Commission's new refugee plan will be successful. After all, some member states (i.e., the 'Visegrad Four' countries -the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) soundly rejected mandatory refugee quotas. 63 In sum, this study demonstrates that at the level of European political elites, immigration-related threat perceptions are not without consequence on the SC's robustness: the security dilemma dynamics prompted by immigration-related threat perceptions have definitively destabilized the Schengen Area. At this juncture, sceptics may be asking why these mechanisms do not eventually lead to the collapse of the SC as a whole. It is our contention that this question is mainly an empirical one: only empirical developments will tell if these dynamics have the potential not only to weaken but also to completely dismantle the SC. In this extreme case, we expect other factors-beyond the immigration-related threat perception that was at the heart of this study-such as economic and domestic political factors to play a crucial role in such a destructive process. A possible explanation for the persistence of the SC though, might be the political and institutional counter-moves belonging to the deep-seated security dynamics proper to the SC. These counter-reactions are interesting to investigate in their own rights but this goes beyond the scope of this study. Here we rather aimed at showing that the recent developments shaking the Schengen Area, cannot be regarded as mere migration management and border control disagreements eroding Schengen's cooperative dynamics.
Instead, they denote complex social processes involving changing identities, norms, practices and trust relations that have the potential to severely damage the interactions among the Member States of the Schengen Area and possibly beyond. The question of whether or not these dynamics have the potential to affect other European regimes of cooperation and possibly the EU as a whole is left to be examined in future research.
Finally, several avenues for further research are suggested. A first possibility could be to investigate how SCs could surmount an immigration-related crisis of the type described above. Indeed, as the constructivist nature of the security dilemma suggests, the negative dynamics related to immigration-related threat perceptions, are by no means irreversible. Hence we suggest two mechanisms with the potential to reverse these detrimental processes. The first mechanism could build on existing SC literature addressing the rehabilitation of collective identities and trust among an SC's members in times of crisis, either by way of re-building a sense of common unifying purpose (i.e humanitarian aid for refugees) (á la Kitchen 2009), through verbal fighting (á la Bially-Matern 2005) in order to persuade deserting member states into past 'common practices' (i.e., the re-enforcement of the Dublin convention) or through the reshaping of common institutional practices in face of the new immigration-related uncertainty, in a manner that would make member states behavior more 'expected' (á la Pouliot 2011) (i.e., common refugees quotas). The second mechanism relates, to our view, to the root causes of the crisis, namely the immigration-related threat perceptions within SC, and draws on the existing de-securitization literature. De-securitization strategies generally emanate from the public and NGO's level, but can also be initiated by SC elites. 64 In any case, the purpose of such strategies is to prevent immigrants from being framed in terms of security. From this perspective, research would explore processes of immigration-related de-securitization within the SC that could reduce the state of uncertainty caused by immigration-related threat perceptions as well as related fears, thereby eliminating the motivation for suspicion towards other member states.
Last but not least, another promising direction for further research would explore the extent to which the above insights resonate with other cases of SCs. We have chosen to illustrate our theoretical insights by focusing on the specific case of the Schengen regime. This, by no means, indicates that these insights cannot be applied and developed further in order to learn more about the impact of immigration related security perceptions on other types of (Security)
Communities. After all, the mechanism for activating a security dilemma dynamic in an SC is arguably not just limited to Europe (as is the development of an SC) and it would be interesting to explore whether it is possible to draw any parallels between the European experience and US-Canadian relations for instance. An important inquiry in this regard deals with the possible difference in the impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on different degrees of SCs, for example, 'pluralistic' vs. 'tightly coupled' SCs. In this respect, one question worth exploring is whether the impact on less developed SCs (without common borders or common immigration policy) would be less devastating and dramatic than the impact on mature SCs.
Notes
1 We therefore accept the less traditional thinking and study of SC's of Bremberg (2015: 678) according to which SC is not only about 'hard security,' but also involves low-key and routinebased security practices towards non-military perceived threats. Moreover, according to Bremberg, the absence of preparations for armed conflict-as a proxy for dependable expectations of peaceful change-might not be the only, or even the best, means of identifying security communities. Rather, those can be indicated by 'inter-state relations that are organized in overlapping and concentric circles'. 
